Outgrowing resource dependence theory and some recent developments by Martin, Will
 
Outgrowing Resource Dependence 
 






















Many policy makers are concerned about dependence on resource exports. This paper 
examines four changes that reduce this dependence: (i) accumulation of capital and skills; 
(ii) changes in protection policy, particularly reductions in the burden of protection on 
exporters; (iii) differential rates of technical change; and (iv) declines in transport costs. 
Developing countries as a group have made enormous progress in diversifying their 
exports away from resources in recent decades, a development that appears to have been 
aided by accumulation of capital and skills and by dramatic reductions in the cost of 
protection to exporters, but slowed down by technological advances that favored 
agriculture. 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3482, January 2005 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 



















































































































dOutgrowing Resource Dependence: 




Policy makers in many developing countries are concerned about continuing dependence 
on exports of resource-based products. Concerns about such dependence arise from a 
number of factors including concerns about: adverse trends in the terms of trade for 
commodities; the perceived volatility in their prices; the possibility of lower rates of 
productivity growth in resource production; and incentives for rent-seeking.  
 
Frequently, this concern manifests itself in policy approaches that are either ineffective in 
reducing resource dependence, or unhelpful to economic development. Approaches that 
are likely to be ineffective include exhortations to the private sector to diversify their 
export mix. Proposals that are likely to be unhelpful include the provision of protection to 
import-competing industries.  
 
The first part of the paper identifies policies that can both contribute to economic 
development and to reduction in resource dependence. These include: (i) accumulation of 
capital and skills; (ii) changes in protection policy, particularly reductions in the burden 
of protection on exporters; (iii) differential rates of technical change; and (iv) declines in 
transport costs. Then, the paper examines recent changes in developing country policies, 
and their environment, and export outcomes.  
 
There has been a dramatic change in the composition of developing country exports since 
the mid-1960s. The share of manufactures in has risen from around 15 percent to over 80 
percent, with a corresponding reduction in the importance of agricultural and mineral 
resource-based products. This is shown to reflect changes in the volumes of exports, 
rather than changes in relative prices.  
 
Possible contributors to this development are identified as higher rates of accumulation of 
physical capital in many developing countries than in the industrial countries; and higher 
rates of growth in education per worker in all developing regions. Another fundamental 
change that appears likely to have contributed to this transformation is the dramatic 
reduction in developing-country trade barriers. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and exchange 
rate overvaluation have all been reduced dramatically. This has greatly reduced the 
burden imposed by protection on export-oriented manufactures. The role of technological 
change is less clear. The evidence suggests that, if anything, technical change has been 
more rapid in agriculture than in manufactures, a factor that would be expected to retard 
reductions in dependence on agricultural exports. Clearly, however, reductions in 
transport costs have contributed to the development of global production sharing models 
that have increased developing countries’ ability to participate in manufactures trade. 
 




Countries vary greatly in the share of their exports derived from resource-based activities. 
In those countries that obtain a large share of their export revenues from resource-based 
activities, a goal of reducing resource dependence is frequently a major influence on 
policy. The importance placed on this goal is particularly marked in resource-dependent 
developing countries, but has also emerged in high-income countries such as the 
Netherlands and Australia in the form of concerns about de-industrialization during 
periods of growth in resource-based industries (Gregory 1976; Snape 1977).  
 
There are many reasons why policy makers may wish to reduce the share of a 
country’s export revenues obtained from commodities produced using resource-intensive 
procedures. These include: (i) the concerns about potentially adverse trends in the terms 
of trade for commodities raised by Prebisch, (ii) concerns about the perceived instability 
of returns from commodities and possible resulting problems of unemployment and 
output loss (Cashin and McDermott 2002), (iii) perceptions that the rate of technological 
change in resource-dependent activities may be lower than in manufactures or services, 
and (iv) concerns that resource-intensive production may promote rent-seeking activities, 
lower growth rates, and increase the risk of civil war (Sachs and Warner 1995, Collier 
2000). 
 
Clearly, given the potential stakes involved with decisions about changing 
resource dependence, and the fundamental nature of many of the policies advocated for 
achieving this objective, there is a great need for carefully formulated policies if this 
objective is to be achieved. Unfortunately, much of the policy debate surrounding these 
objectives takes place at a sufficiently high level of abstraction that it does not provide 
much guidance. Consequently, many of the policies adopted to this end seem ad hoc and 
potentially counter-productive. A very common response, for example, is a relatively 
arbitrary set of protectionist measures designed, perhaps, to promote activity and learning 
in manufacturing sectors. But, as we shall see, protectionist policies may have quite  
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contrary effects. In fact, it seems likely that liberalization is key to increasing 
diversification and not, as many have feared (eg Parris 2003), to continuing dependence. 
 
The choice of policy options for dealing with this problem also needs to be based 
on good diagnostics, and to take a broad view of the policy options.  It is possible, for 
instance, that a country relying on a set of different commodities may find that the 
variance of returns from the resulting portfolio is not excessive—or that shifting from 
commodities to manufactures would not reduce the variance of returns (see Martin 1988 
for example).  Further, if excessive instability of export returns is identified as a problem, 
then the most effective solution may lie in portfolio management approaches that allow 
reductions in the volatility of consumption without attempting to reduce the volatility of 
annual earnings. Such a solution is consistent with the general principle in economic 
policy of targeting the policy solution as closely as possible to the problem at hand.  
 
Policies that attempt to deal with the risks associated with commodity dependence 
by diversifying the structure of output should not generally be undertaken unless analysis 
indicates that: (i) there are market failures that are reducing the extent to which the 
production structure should shift away from commodities, and that (ii) policy options are 
available that will diversify output and improve overall economic performance. While 
these criteria might appear daunting, there are many cases where they will be fulfilled. 
 
Potential causes of resource dependence in the structure of output and exports 
include: (i) unusually large endowments of natural resources; (ii) limited supplies of 
factors such as capital and human capital that are used more intensively in manufactures 
and services than in resource-based industries; (iii) low productivity in manufactures and 
services; (iv) trade and pricing policies that discriminate against export-oriented 
manufactures and services; and (v) high transport and communication costs. Since 
countries would not generally wish to reduce their endowments of natural resources
1, the 
policy solutions to what is regarded as an “excessive” level of dependence on natural 
resources are likely to lie in the four areas (ii) to (v).  
                                                 
1 Although they may wish to consider the timing of exploitation of non-renewable resources.  
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 These four influences on resource dependence are clearly strongly related to the 
basic determinants of structural change identified in the classic Chenery, Robinson and 
Syrquin (1986) study of industrialization and structural change. One other influence on 
the structure of output, and of exports, identified by Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin is 
non-homotheticity of consumer demand, although this is difficult to use this for policy 
purposes.  Low income elasticities of demand may, in fact, cause a country undergoing 
unbiased growth to become more reliant on exports of commodities. 
 
A wide range of policies designed to promote the development of favored sectors 
have been discussed under the rubric of industrial policy (see Pack 2000 and Stiglitz 
1996). Industrial policies have included many specific policies, such as provision of 
infrastructure, support for education; export promotion activities; technology promotion 
programs; duty exemption and drawback arrangements for exporters; and preferential 
allocation of credit to exporting industries. All of these policies can be seen ultimately as 
affecting the level and structure of output through one of the four channels considered in 
this paper.  
 
The process of developing growth models that go beyond balanced growth is only 
now getting under way (see, for example, Kongsamut, Rebelo and Danyang Xie 2001). 
Specifying model features in a way that will allow them to be useful in analyzing the 
profound structural changes associated with reducing resource dependence seems likely 
to require more sources of structural change than are included in most current growth 
models.  
 
As noted in World Bank (2003), and in Martin (2003), there have been dramatic 
changes in the participation of developing countries in world trade. The share of 
manufactures in total merchandise exports has increased dramatically, at the expense of 
the traditional stalwarts—agricultural products and minerals. This change has been 
associated with dramatic shifts in policy toward trade openness, and with increases in 
factor endowments, that raise the available capital and skills per worker.   
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In this paper, a simple general equilibrium framework sufficiently general to 
incorporate the structural changes associated with reductions in resource dependence is 
specified. It is then used as an organizing framework to examine some data on changes in 
export patterns of developing countries and indicators of the influences on resource 
dependence identified in the conceptual framework. This analysis is then followed by 




For this paper, we need a formulation sufficiently general that it can encompass 
changes in factor endowments, changes in technology, and changes in price policies. The 
dual approach popularized by Dixit and Norman (1980) provides this flexibility. The 
production side of the economy can be represented using a restricted profit function 
specifying the value of net output in the economy as a function of the domestic prices of 
outputs and intermediate inputs: 
(1)  π = π( p , v)  = maxx {p.x (x, v) feasible} 
where  π is the value-added accruing to the vector of quasi-fixed factors ,v,  in the 
economy given the vector of domestic prices, p, for gross outputs of the vector of   
produced goods, x. The vector v includes economy-wide stocks of mobile factors, any 
sector-specific factor inputs, and public goods such as infrastructure, that may not be 
readily allocable to particular sectors. 
 
As Dixit and Norman (1980) note, the specification in equation (1) represents all 
of the properties of the production technology. It is extremely general, being able to 
represent many different types of technology depending upon the particular functional 
form used to specify the GDP function. These specifications may include the familiar 2*2 
Heckscher-Ohlin model with two factors and two outputs, and no intermediate inputs, 
through a range of specifications of much greater generality. It may also include 
specifications such as the Leamer (1987) model in which there are more goods than 
factors, and small, open economies move between different cones of diversification in  
  5
which the set of commodities produced change. The specification is also sufficiently 
general to include forward and backward linkages induced by input-output linkages and 
transport costs.  
 
Over the range where the profit function is differentiable, its derivatives with 
respect to the prices of output yield a vector of net output supplies: 
(2)   πp    = πp(p,v) 
 
Depending upon the specification of the profit function, it may be possible to 
identify the gross outputs of each good, and the quantities of these goods used as 
intermediate inputs in production. For some purposes, such as estimating the incentives 
created by a protection structure, it is very important to be able to identify the net outputs.  
 
The derivative of the profit function with respect to the factor endowments gives 




One additional important expression is the matrix of Rybczynski derivatives. 
Differentiating the vector of price derivatives, πp   , by the vector of resource endowments 
(or, equivalently by Young’s theorem, differentiating the vector of factor prices by the 
price vector) yields a matrix, πpv , of changes in the net output vector resulting from 
changes in factor endowments. This matrix is clearly critical for our analysis, but its exact 
structure depends heavily upon the particular situation.  
 
In the simple, two factor, two output model used in textbook treatments, the 
Rybczynski responses take a very clearly-defined form in any economy that is producing 
both outputs. As the supply of one factor increases, the output of the sector in which that 
factor is used intensively increases. The output of the other good declines, despite the 
increase in the total resources available to the economy. Importantly, factor prices do not 
change. The required change factor use is achieved by changing the mix of outputs, rather  
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than by changing factor prices. As long as the number of factors and the number of 
outputs remains the same, this mechanism can be generalized to economies in which 
there are multiple factors and multiple outputs. The concept of relative factor intensity 
can be generalized to indicate the increase in the cost of producing a good when the price 
of a factor increases (Dixit and Norman 1980, p57). 
 
The most difficult case to analyze is the realistic situation in which there are more 
goods than factors. Leamer (1987) and Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez and Schott (1999) 
provide an extremely useful analytical framework for analyzing this problem where there 
are three factors and many goods. In simple cases
2,  countries with three factors will 
specialize in the production of three goods. Over some range, the features of the 
Rybczynski theorem will hold and changes in factor endowments will result in changes in 
the mix of output without changes in factor prices. However, changes beyond that point 
will result in shifts into a new cone of diversification, with a change in the mix of output 
and a fall in the return to the factor whose relative supply is being augmented. As Leamer 
(1987, p967) points out the location of these cones of diversification depends upon 
commodity prices, and hence is not merely a function of technology.  
 
In the case of resource-poor economies, Leamer et al show that the adjustment 
path associated with accumulation of human and physical capital is likely to be relatively 
smooth, with increases in the supply of capital raising the demand for raw labor as the 
economy moves through different cones of diversification. For resource-abundant 
economies, however, the path may involve reductions in unskilled labor as the economy 
moves from, say, peasant farming to resource-based systems involving greater use of 
capital. This move may be associated with reductions in the returns to unskilled labor that 
increase income inequality.  
 
For some problems, such as situations where some goods are nontraded, we need 
to consider the consumption side of the economy as well as the production side. The 
                                                 
2 In the absence, for instance, of nontraded goods.   
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consumption side of the economy can be represented similarly using an expenditure 
function: 
(3) e(p,  u) 
where e represents the expenditure required to achieve a specified level of utility, u, and 
represents all of the economically relevant features of consumer preferences. Assuming 
differentiability of the expenditure function, the vector of consumer demands can be 
obtained as: 
(4) ep(p, u) 
An important feature of real-world consumer preferences is their non-
homotheticity, with commodities like basic food having small or negative responses to 
income increases, while luxury goods have large positive income effects. The vector of 
Marshallian income effects can be derived from (4) as: 
cY =   (epu/eu) 
where eu is the marginal impact of a change in utility on expenditure, and epu is the 
marginal impact of a change in utility on the consumption of each good.  
 
The vector of net imports of commodities is given by m, which is the difference 
between the vector of consumption and the vector of net outputs: 
 
m = ep - rp  
 
World prices of traded goods are determined by the market clearing condition that 
the sum of the net trade vectors for all regions must equal zero. Where some goods are 
non-traded, the relevant sub-vector of m is exogenously equal to zero and equilibrium in 
the market for these goods is achieved by adjustments in the prices of these goods. 
Similarly, where trade in some goods is determined by binding quotas, the relevant sub-
vector of m is set exogenously at the quota level and equilibrium is achieved by 
endogenous determination of these prices. 
 
Trade policy distortions are represented very simply as creating a difference 
between the vector of domestic prices, p, and world prices, pw for the small representative  
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economy.  It is frequently useful to define a net expenditure function z = (e –r ).  The 
derivative of this function with respect to prices, zp = (ep – rp ) is also equal to the vector 
of net imports.  This function also provides a compact way of representing the revenues 
accruing from trade distortions as R = (p - pw).zp  
 
Finally, the welfare impacts of any exogenous shock can be represented using the 
balance of trade function (Anderson and Neary 1992; Lloyd and Schweinberger 1988). 
This function takes into account the effects of trade distortions on the cost of 
expenditures, the revenue to producers, and the revenues from trade distortions (or 
domestic taxes, which are levied on only expenditures or producer revenues). The 
specification of this function is based on the assumption that all revenue from trade 
distortions is returned to the representative consumer. If this is not the case, the function 
needs to be modified to take into account losses of such revenues to, for example, foreign 
governments or foreign traders. The balance of trade function, B, can be specified as: 
 
(5)  B   =   z (p, v, u )  -zp(p – pw) – f 
 
where f is an exogenously specified financial inflow from abroad. When u is held 
constant, and changes are made in any of the exogenous variables of the system, changes 
in B show the change in the financial inflow needed to maintain the initial level of utility 
in the face of the changes in the exogenous variables. This change in income is a measure 
of the compensating variation associated with the change.  
 
Before the system can be used to analyze the consequences of changes in 
productivity, we need to augment this standard system to include the impacts of technical 
change on producer behavior and producer profits. As noted by Martin and Alston 
(1997), there is a number of ways in which this might be done, but perhaps the most 
appealing in terms of flexibility and consistency with economic theory is to represent 
technological change as resulting in a distinction between actual and effective units of an 
input or output. In the case of an output-augmenting technological advance, such a 
change might be one that increases the actual output achieved from the same bundle of  
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inputs—such as an increase in the grain available for consumption from a given amount 
available for harvest in the field. In the case of an input-augmenting technological 
advance, the change might be one that reduces the actual quantity of the input required to 
achieve the same outcome—such as a reduction in the amount of labor needed to 
complete a task. Product quality improvements and promotion policies might create a 
similar augmentation of the product from the viewpoint of the user—a product 
augmentation, rather than a process augmentation. 
 
Such technological changes have two important impacts on behavior and 
profitability. The first is the direct response of output associated with the initial level of 
inputs in the case of an output-augmenting technical change, or the change in required 
inputs to achieve a given level of output. The second impact is the induced impact 
resulting from changes in the effective prices of inputs.  In representing such technical 
changes, it is necessary to take into account both the direct impacts on output/inputs, and 
the indirect impacts working through induced changes in the effective prices of outputs or 
inputs.  
 
In the case of output-augmenting technical change, we can define effective output 
i as:  
(6) xi
* = xi.τi  
where τ is a technical change parameter equal to unity before the technological change. 
We can define a corresponding output price as: 
(7) pi
* = pi.τi.   
 
In the case of an output-augmenting technical change
3, the effect of the 
technological change is to increase the effective output associated with any given bundle 
of inputs, and to raise the effective price of output. Clearly, both of these effects operate 
                                                 
3 It is also possible to consider input-augmenting technical change, as in cases where technical change is 
factor-biased, as in the frequently-adopted case of Harrod-Neutral technical change. In this case, the direct 
impact of the technological change is to reduce the quantity of the input required to achieve the initial level 
of output, and to increase demand for the through the associated reduction in the effective price of the 
input.  
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in the same direction, tending to increase output at any given output price. The first does 
so by increasing the outputs obtained from any given level of inputs, and the second by 
drawing additional inputs into production of this good. In the case of an input-
augmenting technical change, the direct effect is to reduce the inputs required to achieve 
a given level of output, while the indirect effect is to increase output as producers 
substitute the input whose effective price has fallen for other inputs. In this case, the 
effect on input use is ambiguous, depending upon whether the direct input-saving effect 
is outweighed by the substitution effect.  
 
Rewriting equation (2) in terms of effective prices and quantities as defined in 
equations (6) and (7) allows us to assess the impacts of an improvement in technology in 
sector i on output from that sector in a small, open economy. Differentiating the supply of 
















which can be rearranged to yield: 
 












where ηii is the own-price elasticity of supply for good i. The intuition behind 
equation (8) is that a technological advance proportionately increases the output 
generated by the resources originally committed to production of the good. In addition, it 
increases the effective price of the output, and hence induces an additional increase in 
output equal to the own-price elasticity of supply.  
 
Another influence on the response of output and resource use is the impact of the 
technological change on the actual price of output. In a small, open economy, the actual 
price is unaffected by technological changes, unless the technical change is global, when 
it will affect world prices. However, for a closed economy, technical changes can be  
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expected to affect the price of output. The higher the elasticity of consumer demand in 
this situation, the smaller the decline in the actual price of output, and the more likely it is 
that input use will rise when production of a particular output benefits from a 
technological advance. Matsuyama (1992) distinguished between an open-economy 
situation in which improvements in agricultural technology increased input use in 
agriculture, and a closed-economy case in which improvements in agricultural 
technology allowed the demanded level of output to be produced with fewer inputs.   
When trade in a good is quantity-constrained, either for natural reasons such as transport 
costs or because of policy constraints such as quotas, we can readily modify the 
derivation of equation (8) to take the consequent changes in actual output prices into 
account. For a single non-traded good in an undistorted economy, the (compensated) 
impact
4 on prices is given by:(9)  dp/p   =   (1 + ηii)/(εii - ηii) dτ/τ 
 
where εii is the compensated elasticity of demand for good i.  
 
One informative limiting case is the one where the elasticity of demand is very 
small relative to the elasticity of supply. While this case appears very restrictive, it is 
probably a realistic approximation in many cases, since general-equilibrium supply 
elasticities for a single industry in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting are determined only through 
impacts of changes in its output on factor prices and are likely to be very much larger in 
absolute value than demand elasticities. In this case, (9) reduces to  
dp/p   =   - (1 + 1/ηii) dτ/τ 
This identifies two components of the price reduction. The unit impact is the price 
reduction required to exactly offset the impact of the technical change on the effective 
price of output, and hence on the supply of actual output. The second is the decline in the 
domestic price needed to offset the direct stimulus to supply (at any given level of inputs) 
resulting from the technical change. Given the dramatic growth rates feasible in some 
export-oriented sectors, this difference could result in very large differences in the 
welfare benefits obtainable from technical change.  
                                                 
4 We focus on compensated impacts as these are simpler, and more relevant to the calculation of 




The framework outlined above provides a potential basis analysis of changes in 
the structure of the economy in general, and resource dependence in particular. The 
purpose of this paper is not to test hypotheses, rather it is to examine changes in some of 
the relevant basic data. Such an examination is vitally needed, as there have been 
dramatic changes in the composition of exports from developing countries during the past 
twenty years. The extent and rapidity of this changes is highlighted in Figure 1, which 
shows that developing countries as a group have reduced their reliance on exports of 
agricultural and mineral commodities. In the late 1970s, agricultural and mineral 
commodities accounted for close to three quarters of exports from developing countries. 
By the late 1990s, this share had fallen to less than a fifth.  
 
Figure 1. The Changing Pattern of Merchandise Exports from Developing 
Countries 
Source: GTAP Version 5 Database.  
 
 
















As is clear from the data presented in Appendix Table 1, the decline in the 
importance of resource-based products has not been confined merely to a few countries. 
Manufactures have become the dominant exports of a wide range of developing 
countries. Even countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have increased the share of manufactures in their total exports to 
the point where manufactures make up almost a quarter of the exports of the group 
(Martin 2001b). 
 
To ensure that the changes in Figure 1 reflect changes in output volumes, rather 
than simply changes in product prices, the commodity output shares were re-estimated in 
1965 prices using deflators from the World Bank’s Development Prospects’ Group. 
Specifically, agricultural exports were deflated by the World Bank’s index of agricultural 
product prices for developing country exports; mineral exports were deflated by the price 
of oil; and manufactures export prices were deflated by the UN Manufactures’ Unit 
Value index. The resulting commodity shares are presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Change in Developing Country Export Shares at 1965 Prices 
 
 


















































The numbers presented in Figure 2 show that the changes in the composition of 
developing country exports have been the result of shifts in the quantities of exports they 
produce, rather than solely in the prices received for outputs. This figure shows that the 
increase in the importance of manufactures exports began in earnest in the 1970s, rather 
than the 1980s as suggested by the graph in nominal values. The dramatic increase in the 
price of oil, and hence the share of minerals, during the 1970s obscured this fundamental 
shift in Figure 1.  
 
Developing countries’ dependence on exports of resource-based products has 
been further reduced by an increase in the importance of services exports. Figure 3 
presents data on the shares of commercial
5 services in the exports of goods and services 
from major country groups. While these numbers are the only ones available as a time 
series, they appear to considerably understate the importance of services exports. 
Karsenty (2000) estimates that this category of services now account for only around 60 
percent of the total exports of services covered by the four modes of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In the early 1980s, commercial services made 
up 17 percent of the exports of high income countries—a share that has since risen to 20 
percent (shown as High in the Figure). In the low and middle income group (LMC in 
Figure 3), services trade started out much less important, at 9 percent, but rose much 
more rapidly, to 17 percent. Amongst the relatively poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), the share also grew rapidly, from 10 to 15 percent. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Commercial services is a balance of payments concept covering services traded across borders (GATS 
Mode 1) or through movement of the consumer (GATS Mode 2). It excludes services traded by 
establishing a service-providing firm in the consuming country (GATS Mode 3) or by temporary 
movement of service providers (GATS Mode 4).   
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A key challenge is clearly to understand and explain the changes in the structure 
of output and exports that underly these sharp changes in the structure of exports from 
developing countries. These changes are so profound and rapid as to call into question 
much previous discussion of developing country trade policy, which typically postulates 
developing countries as reliant almost exclusively on exports of agricultural and natural 
resource products (see, for example, Buffie 2001, p151). Clearly, the policy implications 
for reducing resource dependence, and for development policy more generally, will differ 
greatly depending upon the causes of this dramatic change. In the next three sub-sections 
of the paper, we examine the available evidence on the factors most likely to influence 
the composition of exports. Changes in factor endowments are considered first, followed 
by changes in protection policy. Finally, the role of technological advance is examined. 
 












The Role of Factor Accumulation 
 
For factor accumulation to have a major impact on the structure of output and 
exports, two conditions need to be satisfied. The first relates to the structure of the πpv 
matrix and requires that changes in relative factor endowments must result in substantial 
changes in the composition of output à la Rybczynski, rather than on changes in factor 
proportions within sectors as in the neoclassical growth model. The second is that there 
must be sizeable changes in relative factor endowments, that is that that ∆ν must be non-
uniform. In this section, the evidence on the impacts of changes in factor endowments is 
first examined, and then the evidence on changes in relative factor endowments. Finally, 
attention turns to the extent to which the Rybczynski assumption of exogenous, or at least 
pre-determined, factor endowments can be taken to be realistic.  
  
Whether changes in relative factor endowments will affect the composition of 
output is a question that can only be resolved through empirical studies. If, for instance, 
the factor intensities of different sectors were not greatly different, or if different factors 
were near-perfect substitutes, this effect would not be expected to be large. The empirical 
impact of factor accumulation on the share of output and hence on export patterns has 
received considerable attention in recent years. A number of studies using quite different 
approaches have concluded that changes in factor endowments can have quite strong 
impacts on the composition of output and exports, rather than on factor prices, 
confirming the potential empirical importance of the Rybczynski theorem.  
 
Martin and Warr (1992) examine the determinants of the rapid decline in the 
share of agriculture in Indonesian GDP. They estimated, using time-series data, a profit-
function that incorporates the factor endowment and technological change effects 
discussed in this study as well as relative price changes that include the impacts of 
changes in trade policy. Their conclusion was that the most important determinant of the 
reduction in the share of agriculture in the Indonesian economy was increases in the 
capital-labor ratio. The output price effects that take into account the effects of factors 
such as changes in protection policy and in worldwide technical change played a much  
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smaller role. Technological advance was found to be biased towards agriculture, and 
hence tending to increase agriculture’s share of output, other things equal. 
 
Gehlhar, Hertel and Martin (1994) used a completely different analytical tool—
the GTAP computable general equilibrium model of the world economy—to examine the 
changing structure of the world economy. This model incorporates the non-homotheticity 
in consumer demand that plays such an important role in discussions of the decline in 
agriculture’s share of output in the world economy. It also includes input-output tables 
with the differences in the factor intensities of different sectors that drive the Rybczynski 
effects when relative factor endowments change. Further, it includes forward and 
backward linkages through its input-output structure and the transport costs that loom 
large in the new economic geography. The model was first validated over the 1980s to 
ensure that it could realistically replicate the changes in sectoral shares of exports in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Then, the structure of output was projected from 1992 to 2002. A 
key conclusion of the analysis was that the most important determinant of likely changes 
in agricultural output and trade patterns, and particularly a sharp decline in reliance on 
agricultural exports in East Asian developing economies, was likely to be differential 
rates of factor accumulation, rather than non-homotheticity in consumer demand.  
 
Harrigan (1997) examines the impact of technological changes and changes in 
relative factor endowments on the structure of manufacturing output in a panel of OECD 
countries. His econometric results caused him to conclude that factor endowment 
changes, as well as technological changes, have large effects on output shares. Kee 
(2001) reaches the same conclusion in a study of the manufacturing sector in Singapore. 
 
In a completely different literature, Hanson and Slaughter (2000) examine the 
implications of changes in the supply of workers with different skill levels in states of the 
United States. They find that a key part of the adjustment to changes in the supply of 
workers of a particular type is a change in the structure of output of the type suggested by 
Rybczynski effects.  
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There remains some controversy about the relevance of the Rybczynski theorem 
in some cases. Cohen and Hsieh (2000) focused on the very large immigration of Russian 
Jews into Israel in the early 1990s and found results more in line with the single-sector 
neoclassical model: a short-run fall in the wages of native Israelis and a rise in the return 
to capital. Equilibrium was restored through an increase in the capital stock associated 
with increased external borrowing. This was, however, something of a special case. 
Investigation of the response of the output response to this shock, and the response itself, 
was complicated by the ambiguous skills endowment of the immigrants. While they were 
much more highly educated than the native population, they suffered substantial 
occupational downgrading which made it difficult to assess whether the output response 
should have involved outputs intensive in skilled or unskilled labor.  
 
If one accepts the potential validity of the Rybczynski theorem as a potential 
cause of structural change, a key question is whether there have been major changes in 
relative factor endowments that would cause changes in the composition of developing 
country output away from dependence on resources. Recent data on accumulation of 
human and physical capital suggest that there have been quite sharp changes both 
between developed and developing regions, and between different developing country 
regions. The most comprehensive such database of which I am aware is that by Nehru 
and his coauthors (Nehru and Dhareshwar 1993; Nehru, Swanson and Dubey 1995).   
 
Table 1. Annual Changes in Factor Endowment Ratios 
 K/L  K/Q  Edn/L  Edn/Q Secondary  Tertiary
        Edn/L  Edn/L
  % % %  %  %  % 
Industrial  3.7 1.1 0.3  -2.3  2.2  4.9 
Developing           
East  Asia  5.1 2.3 4.2  1.4  9.2  3.4 
South  Asia  3.2 1.4 3.3  1.5  4.3  6.4 
Latin  America  2.4 1.4 2.0  1.0  5.3  6.7 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  2.1 2.1 4.2  4.2  9.7  12.6 
M. East & N. Africa  3.4  3.2  2.3  2.1  1.9  6.3 
Source: Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993); Nehru, Swanson and Dubey (1995). Rates for physical 
capital refer to 1960-90 and for education to 1960-87.  
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The first column of Table 1 points to quite rapid increases in physical capital per 
worker (K/L) in both industrial and developing countries. The 5.1 percent per year 
growth rate for East Asia implies more than a quadrupling of capital per worker over the 
thirty year period of observation. The 2.4 percent a year increase in Latin America 
implies more than a doubling of the capital-labor ratio over the period. Even the 2.1 
percent per year increase in Sub-Saharan Africa implies a near doubling of capital per 
worker.  The stock of education per worker, measured by years of schooling completed, 
grew at quite high rates in most developing country regions, although it grew very slowly 
in the industrial countries.  This was particularly the case for secondary and tertiary 
education stocks, which grew extremely rapidly in most developing country regions. The 
9.2 percent annual growth in the stock of secondary school education in East Asia, for 
instance, implies a fourteen-fold increase in this stock over thirty years.  
 
Before placing too much emphasis on the apparent increases in capital and in 
education per worker in developing countries as indicators of changes in factor 
endowments, it is important to examine the capital-output ratio (K/Q). One of Kaldor’s 
key stylized facts of economic growth (Branson 1979, p465) was a constant 
capital/output ratio and a rising capital/labor ratio. This is frequently interpreted to imply 
that technical change is Harrod-neutral, with capital per worker increasing in line with 
effective labor. If true, this would imply an absence of changes in factor endowments, 
implying no long run changes in factor endowment ratios, and hence no role for 
Rybczynski effects.  
 
In fact, it appears from Table 1 that the physical capital-output ratio increased 
quite substantially over the period in both developing and industrial countries. For human 
capital, the education to output ratios have increased substantially in developing 
countries, but fallen quite rapidly in developed countries. These results have potentially 
important implications for our interpretation of the process of growth and structural 
change. Before going too far, however, it is important to check the Nehru et al data 
against other data sets to ensure that these results are not merely artifacts of the data  
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construction process. A check against the well-known Penn World Tables data (see 
www.nber.org) for a range of countries suggests that physical capital/output ratios were 
generally rising quite rapidly in the 1970-1990 period for which the capital accumulation 
data are available. The fact that the growth rates of K/Q and Edn/Q are generally lower 
than their growth relative to the labor input does, however, give reason for caution about 
common assumptions, such as Hicks-Neutral technical change in all sectors used by 
Harrigan (1997) and Kee (2001). 
 
Despite the evidence from many different types of empirical studies on the 
potential role of Rybczynski effects, the coincidence of high rates of accumulation of 
physical and human capital over the period, and the rapid shift of developing countries 
into exports of manufactures and services, is clearly not definitive evidence of causation. 
However, it is strongly suggestive, and needs to be examined in conjunction with changes 




Protection policy is frequently advocated as a means to promote industrial development. 
It can certainly do this for import competing activities, such as production of consumer 
goods. However, this production pattern locks producers into small, and typically slow 
growing, markets for their output. Further, it introduces a major discontinuity. Under a 
protectionist policy regime, an exporter must not only have sufficient comparative 
advantage to be able to compete in world markets, but must have sufficient advantage to 
be able to compete despite  the cost increases resulting from protection levied on its 
intermediate inputs, and the adverse effects of real exchange rate devaluation on its costs 
for factors and nontraded goods.  
 
Developing countries have increasingly come to recognize the adverse impacts of 
protection on their export performance. and begun to adjust their policies towards more 
open trade regimes. The most profound and far-reaching manifestation of developing 
countries’ interest in greater participation in trade is evident from the wave of unilateral  
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trade reforms that has swept the developing countries. These reforms have affected all 
regions, and all of the major types of policy distortions. As discussed in Global Economic 
Prospects 2001 (World Bank 2001, chapter 2) and presented in Figure 4, average tariff 
rates in developing countries have halved, from around 30 percent in the early 1980s, to 
around 15 percent in the late 1990s. The absolute reductions in tariff rates in developing 
countries have been much higher than in industrial countries and, of course, decreases 
from a higher level are likely to have a much greater welfare benefit than corresponding 
decreases from a lower base (see Martin 1997). In addition, the dispersion of tariff rates, 
which typically increases the welfare cost of any given average tariff rate (Anderson 
1995), was substantially reduced. 
 


















1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-98
 
Source: World Bank (2001) 
 
One must be careful when examining changes in tariff rates, because a decline in 
tariffs may reflect substitution of nontariff barriers for tariffs. However, during this 
period, the coverage of nontariff barriers, including state trading monopolies, in 
developing countries also appears to have fallen considerably, as is evident in Table 2.   
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Table 2. Frequency of total core nontariff measures in developing countries, 1989–98 
 
Country  1989–94  1995–98 
  %  % 
East Asia and the Pacific (7)  30.1  16.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean (13)  18.3  8.0 
Middle East and North Africa (4)  43.8  16.6 
South Asia (4)  57.0  58.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa (12)  26.0  10.4 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of countries in each region for which data are available. 
Source: World Bank (2001), based on Michalopoulous (1999) 
 
 
Another important dimension of reform has been a sharp reduction in the number 
of countries using foreign exchange restrictions on current account, and in the average 
foreign exchange premia. The World Bank (2001) reports that the number of developing 
countries applying foreign exchange restrictions on current account has fallen sharply. 
Table 3 shows foreign exchange premia for a range of countries in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This table highlights two things. Firstly, that average foreign exchange market distortions 
were enormous in the 1980s, and that these premia in most developing countries, in most 
regions, have fallen to very low levels. While the simple average foreign exchange rate 
premium is highest in the Middle East and North Africa, at 46.5 percent, this high rate is 
almost entirely due to large premia in Algeria and Iran. If these two outliers are excluded, 
the average rate falls to only 1.4 percent. When Nigeria is excluded, the average premium 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is less than 10 percent, down from 112 percent in the mid 1980s.  
Clearly, for most countries, the premia are now small enough to imply that foreign 




There are good reasons to expect that, in this situation, a high protection regime 
will lock countries into continuing dependence on resource-based commodities which are 
typically less dependent on purchased intermediate inputs than is manufacturing, 
particularly in this era of production fragmentation. To allow further examination of this 
difference, Table 4 presents for a number of countries data on the cost structure of output 
and the effective rates of protection imposed on export-oriented activities. A striking 
feature is the top section of the tables is the much lower dependence of primary 
agriculture and resources commodities on intermediate inputs. This gives resource-based 
activities an opportunity to survive even in situations of very high protection.  
 
It is, of course, possible that the greater vulnerability of manufacturers and 
agricultural processors to high protection regimes would be offset by a type of  tariff 
escalation that involves lower than average protection on intermediate inputs to 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. To see whether this is the case, the second panel 
of Table 4 examines the effective rates of protection applying to exporters. These 
effective rate calculations are done very simply, taking into account only the effects of 
intermediate input shares and tariff rates. They therefore ignore the additional burdens 
imposed on exporters by nontariff barriers on inputs, or by the real exchange rate 
appreciation associated with protection. What the results of these calculations strongly 
suggest is that the pattern of tariff protection does not provide any relief to exporters of 
manufactures or processed agricultural products. In fact, it appears that the pattern of 
Table 3 Average black market premium (percent) 
  1980-89  1990-93  1994-97 
Total 
a  82.0  78.2  20.3 
East Asia  3.6  3.6  3.2 
Middle East And North Africa  165.6  351.6  46.5 
-Excluding outliers 
b  7.1  8.8  1.4 
Latin America  48.7  13.1  4.4 
South Asia  40.8  45.1  10.1 
Africa  116.5  28.6  32.2 
-Excluding Nigeria  112.1  25.8  9.6 
Notes: 
a  Sample of 41 developing countries. 
b Algeria and Iran 
Source: World Bank (2001)  
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real-world protection adds to the discrimination against exporters of manufactures and 
processed agricultural products resulting from their greater dependence on intermediate 
inputs.  
 
Table 4. Shares of intermediate inputs and Effective Rates of Protection for exporters, 1997 
 Agriculture  Ag. 
Proc. 
Resources  L Manuf  K Manuf  Services 
 %  %  %  %  %  % 
Input shares            
Argentina 21.8  61.9  11.9  58.9  57.7 24.2 
Chile 40.8  76.8  46.3  65.5  65.2  39.6 
China 42.9  80.0  48.4  74.0  78.3  61.3 
India 32.0  82.3  27.6  69.6  76.8  40.6 
Malawi 40.3  58.2  35.7  55.9  50.9  30.3 
Morocco 34.9  82.7  35.6  62.2  75.7  52.1 
Pakistan 35.0  84.2  18.7  72.2  79.3  41.2 
World 44.5  72.2  37.3  64.5  68.0  39.7 
ERP-X            
Argentina -2.7  -13.6  -0.8  -16.2  -13.7  -2.9 
Chile -5.2  -22.5  -5.6  -11.2  -13.2  -2.6 
China -15.1  -54.0  -7.3  -34.8  -27.9  -13.7 
India -5.4  -38.5  -3.3  -22.6  -34.8  -6.3 
Malawi -7.3  -16.4  -5.0  -15.0  -8.9  -3.9 
Morocco -8.5  -50.4  -1.9  -27.5  -17.9  -8.1 
Pakistan -8.4  -45.4  -5.6  -40.5  -54.0  -12.2 
World -7.2  -25.0  -1.0  -8.5  -5.7  -1.4 
Source:  GTAP 5 database (www.gtap.org).  ERP-X measures the reduction in Value Added caused by 
protection on intermediate inputs under the assumption of homogeneous products. Results for Pakistan are 
based on the composite region ‘Other South Asia” which also includes Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan and the 
Maldives. 
 
Where the negative effective rates of protection seen in the lower panel of Table 4 
the structure of protection is clearly a daunting problem for putative exports of 
manufactures or processed agricultural products, particularly if there are fixed costs 
involved in entering export markets. However, it is clear that this problem is much more 
manageable in many countries than it was in the early 1980s. If we triple China’s 
protection level from its 1997 base to align it with the tariff rates that applied in China in 
the early 1990s, we find negative ERP-X’s of –78 percent for processed food and –62 
percent for labor-intensive manufactures. And this is before the direct adverse impacts of  
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licensing, quotas and nominal exchange rate overvaluation, and the indirect effect of real 
exchange rate appreciation, are factored in.  
 
Direct evidence on the implications of increased openness for exports of 
manufactures is provided by a wide range of empirical studies using traditional CGE 
models. A recent econometric study by Elbadawi, Mengistae and Zeufack (2001) builds 
on recent economic geography models developed by Redding and Venables (2001) and 
concludes that increasing openness in African countries would considerably expand 
exports of manufactures.  
 
Overall, it seems highly likely that the sharp reductions in developing country 
trade distortions since the early 1980s have played a vital role in allowing developing 
countries to so sharply increase their exports of manufactures, and hence reduce their 




Technological change is a very important determinant of changes in both resource 
dependence and economic growth and development. Unfortunately, it is relatively poorly 
understood because of the complexity of many of the processes that lead to technological 
change, and because of the problems involved in measuring technical change.  
 
Much thinking on the role of technological change in promoting structural change 
has been confused by a failure to distinguish between open and closed economies. The 
oft-encountered argument that technical advance in agriculture promotes industrialization 
by freeing up resources formerly used in agriculture is, as pointed out by Matsuyama 
(1992) likely to be relevant only in a closed economy. In an open economy, technical 
change that increases productivity in agriculture, or any other sector, will generally 
increase the size of that sector by drawing additional resources into the sector because of 
induced increases in the profitability of production.  
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Assuming a relatively open economy, a key determinant of whether resources are 
likely to shift from agricultural and other resource-based products into manufactures and 
services is the relative rates of technical change. Many economists, including Matsuyama 
(1992) follow a tradition dating back to Adam Smith and assume that productivity growth 
in agriculture is very slow. However, more recent empirical studies (eg Bernard and 
Jones 1996; Martin and Mitra 2001) suggest that the average rate of total factor 
productivity growth in agriculture has been higher than in manufacturing. This appears to 
represent a change from results from earlier periods surveyed by Syrquin (1986), in 
which there was no consistent tendency for total factor productivity in agriculture to grow 
more rapidly than productivity in manufactures. This apparent change may reflect the 
substantial investments in international research and dissemination of rural technologies 
during recent decades.  
 
Key results from the Bernard and Jones and the Martin and Mitra studies are 
presented in Table 5. The Bernard and Jones analysis is based on data from OECD 
countries over the period 1970 to 1987, while the Martin and Mitra study is based on data 
collected by Larson and Mundlak (see Larson, Butzer, Mundlak and Crego 2000) for 
1966 to 1992. While this evidence is somewhat limited as a basis for judgement, further 
support for the proposition that agricultural TFP has been more rapid than that in 
manufacturing is provided by a number of single-country studies, including Jorgenson, 
Gollop and Fraumeni (1987). The Bernard and Jones estimate of a small, negative rate of 
TFP growth in mining is surprising given the manifestly rapid changes in the technology 
used for mining, and may reflect resource depletion in some OECD countries.   
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Table 5. Sectoral productivity growth, percent per year. 
 Agriculture  Manufacturing  Mining 
 %  %  % 
OECD 2.6  1.9  -0.2 
Low income countries  1.99  0.69  na 
Middle income countries  2.9  0.97  na 
All developing countries  2.6  0.9  na 
Industrial countries  3.5  2.8  na 
Overall average  2.9  1.6  na 
Sources: OECD results from Bernard and Jones (1996). All other results from Martin and Mitra (2001).  
TFP estimated using factor shares.  
 
The apparently robust finding of relatively rapid technical change in agriculture 
suggests that the decline in developing countries’ dependence on agricultural exports 
cannot simply be explained by higher rates of productivity growth in manufactures. This 
difference, alone, would seem to increase the importance of the other possible 
explanations of increased exports of manufactures from developing countries—
Rybczynski effects and reductions in protection.  
 
There is a possibility of a strong positive interaction between increased export 
orientation and productivity growth in manufacturing exports. This does not appear to 
result from the traditional anecdotal model in which exporters “learn by doing” or from 
their interactions with their foreign customers. Rather, recent studies suggest that the 
firms that choose to export generally have higher productivity and produce higher quality 
products when they begin exporting (Tybout 2001; Hallward-Dreimeyer, Iarossi, and 
Sokoloff 2001). In this situation, it becomes particularly important to have a policy 
environment that encourages entry of firms—whether new or old—into exporting 
activities. Further, the productivity gains from entry can be compounded by the 
expansion of these firms, at the expense of less efficient firms, following entry. Finally, 
as noted in the discussion of technical change, the gains from technical change may be 
much greater when firms have the opportunity to expand than in cases where their market 




One change that has received a great deal of attention as a potential cause of greater 
developing country participation in world trade in manufactures is falling costs of 
communication and transport. It is very clear that communication costs have fallen 
dramatically in recent years, and that new technologies (eg fax and, subsequently, email 
and the world wide web) for communication have greatly increased the ability of firms to 
co-ordinate activities undertaken at distant locations. Transport costs have also fallen in 
many, although not all, cases. 
 
The cost of transport has been shown to have a major impact on trade flows. 
Limão and Venables (1999) find that halving transport costs increases trade volumes by a 
factor of five. They also find that freight costs vary enormously depending on the quality 
of infrastructure and whether a country is land-locked or not. Amjadi and Yeats (1995) 
find that transport costs are particularly high in Africa, and have increased as a share of 
export value since 1970. Using a model based on trade in manufactures, Redding and 
Venables (2000) show that transport costs for trade in output and intermediate inputs can 
be profoundly important for poverty in developing countries that are integrated into world 
trade in manufactures. They conclude that up to 70 percent of the variation in incomes 
between countries can be explained by such geographical factors.  
 
It is widely believed that the costs of ocean shipping have fallen dramatically, and 
that this has been a major factor contributing to globalization. However, as in some 
earlier episodes of globalization (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000), changes in  shipping 
rates have been anything but consistent
6 over the period since 1950. Hummels (1999) 
concludes that liner shipping rates increased by over 50 percent between 1954 and 1983, 
although they declined substantially after 1985 to bring them back close (in real US 
dollar terms) to their 1954 level.  Other costs that depend on infrastructure quality, such 
as port charges, the costs of clearing customs, and internal freight costs, frequently 
                                                 
6 Historical analysis in O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) shows that freight costs between Europe and the 
Far East varied substantially between 1700 and 1760 without evidence of a downward decline. Only in the 
19
th century was a sharp decline in evidence.   
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exceed the cost of ocean freight by a multiple of two or three and whether they have 
declined or not varies greatly depending on the regulatory environment in individual 
countries. Hummels (2001) finds that time costs appear to have an impact equivalent to 
very high transport costs, with every day saved in shipping time equal to a cost saving of 
0.8 per cent ad valorem.  
 
It seems highly likely that reductions in the real costs of transport and 
communications have been important contributors to the rise of global production sharing 
(World Bank 2003) that has enabled many developing countries to greatly increase their 




Any consideration of action to deal with resource dependence needs to begin with 
an assessment of whether a country’s current level of dependence on agricultural and 
resource-based products is excessive in relation to policy goals such as growth, stability 
or considerations of poverty and vulnerability. The analysis of the problem should aim to 
specify the problem very carefully, as the policy solution is likely to depend heavily upon 
the specific nature of the problem. A problem of excessive income variability in a context 
of, for instance, rigid wages that translate terms of trade shocks into unemployment may 
have quite different solutions than a problem of resource rent dependence that leads to 
rent seeking, or provides funding for civil insurgencies (Collier 2001). If the problem is 
one of excessive income variability, then there is a prima facie case for dealing with it 
through a financial policy instrument such as the use of futures contracts, rather than 
through changes in the mix of output in the economy (Priovolos and Duncan 1991).  
 
If the analysis of the problem suggests that problem requires action to change the 
structure of the country’s output and export mix, then policy should focus on achieving 
this change in ways that overcome market failures and maximize the development payoff.  
A key priority is likely to be to stimulate the accumulation of physical and human capital. 
Not surprisingly, attempts to stimulate the development of sectors that are more intensive  
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in physical and human capital than the current output mix without providing additional 
capital inputs are likely to distort resource use throughout the economy. The fact that 
financial capital remains relatively immobile internationally (Gordon and Bovenberg 
1996) means that attempts to increase the accumulation of physical capital are likely to 
focus on stimulating domestic saving. Loayaza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000) draw 
on a large number of studies to provide policy recommendations to this effect. Even if 
factor accumulation is less important for overall economic growth than has previously 
been thought (Easterly and Levine 2001), it seems likely to provide a strong stimulus to a 
shift in the composition of exports towards manufactures and services.  
 
Given the weakness of capital markets in financing intangible assets like human 
capital governments tend to play a much larger role in guiding the accumulation of 
human capital than of physical capital. Accumulation of human capital is likely to have 
both level and growth effects on output, and to facilitate the transformation of the 
economy into one that produces relatively more human-capital-intensive goods. As 
Dessus (1999) notes, the impact of human capital accumulation on both output and on 
poverty reduction depends a great deal on the emphasis of the education system, and on 
its effectiveness. As Leamer et al note, provision of education may need to be very pro-
active, attempting to take into account demands in the next cone of diversification 
associated with economic development, rather than in current activities. As Leamer et al  
note, this may imply training workers for much more sophisticated activities than are 
undertaken in an initially very resource-dependent economy.  
 
Attracting foreign direct investment may help to augment the available capital 
stock, although this source of capital is typically small relative to total investment. 
However, it is possible that foreign direct investment, or sub-contracting relationships 
(Deardorff and Djankov 2000) can help transfer the knowledge needed for rapid 
productivity growth. If attracting foreign investment leads to a focus on developing the 
institutions needed to improve the investment climate—for domestic as well as foreign 
investors—then it can play a particularly important role in development. Use of foreign 
investment implies a need for greater caution in the use of protection policies. Since  
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foreign investors’ returns are based on the  private returns to their capital, investments in 
import-substituting industries are very likely to reduce national income. Second-best 
mechanisms such as export performance requirements have been used to, very 
imperfectly, reduce these problems in the past (Rodrik 1987), but are likely to be largely 
unavailable in the future because of the Uruguay Round agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs).  
 
There is a strong case for relying on an open trade regime as the best approach to 
development and economic restructuring. Activist trade policies can only work in a 
dynamic sense if they promote sufficiently rapid learning in the favored sectors to 
overcome their certain short-run efficiency costs. However, analyses such as that 
performed by Krueger and Tuncer (1982) have failed to find any significant stimulus to 
productivity from infant-industry protection, let alone enough to justify static 
inefficiencies. An open trade regime overcomes the discontinuities resulting from 
positive protection to import-competing sectors and negative protection to exporting 
activities. These sharp discontinuities threaten the viability of manufacturing and service 
sectors that may represent the next step in development as a resource dependent economy 
moves from one cone of diversification to the next. In the presence of such sharp 
discontinuities, import-competing industries are likely to be constrained to grow very 
slowly after they experience a positive shock to productivity—unless the boost to 
productivity is sufficiently large as to make the activity competitive in export markets 
even despite the negative impacts of protection on its input costs and the real exchange 
rate. Constraints on output growth in this situation can greatly reduce the welfare benefits 
from increases in productivity. 
 
If a very low and uniform protection regime cannot be achieved, a case can be 
made for the use of duty exemptions or duty drawback mechanisms to reduce the burden 
of protection on exporting activities. This type of second-best response remains fully 
legal under WTO rules, even though it effectively provides an export subsidy designed to 
offset the burden of import barriers. If implemented properly, such mechanisms can 
reduce the variance of effective rates of protection across importing and exporting  
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activities by increasing the effective rate on exporting activities to zero. Duty exemption 
schemes have certainly been important in stimulating the development of manufacturing 
exports from East Asia (Rodrik 1994; Martin 2001a). However, such schemes are costly 
to implement and frequently stimulate corrupt behavior. Further, they reduce the 
incentives for exporters to press for lower tariffs on their inputs and may, therefore, lead 
to higher protection than in their absence (Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga 2001).   
 
Buffie (2001) makes a second-best case for an escalating tariff to provide high 
effective protection to domestically-oriented industry in the presence of an irremovable 
wage distortion in the import-competing manufacturing sector. However, this case is 
heavily dependent upon the unknown mechanism determining this wage differential. If 
the wage determination mechanism responds to greater protection to the import-
competing sector by increasing the real wage in this sector, this mechanism could be 
extremely costly. Further, it is inferior to a duty exemption arrangement in providing the 
flexibility needed to allow the emergence of new export sectors.  
 
A key issue for policy is to stimulate technological advance in all sectors, but 
particularly in the manufacturing and services sectors that are likely to lie on the 
evolution of the country’s comparative advantage. In this area, Navaretti and Tarr (2000) 
stress the importance of increasing the absorptive capacity, particularly through 
increasing education. Increasing export orientation of the manufacturing sector through 
trade reform and factor accumulation appears to help increase productivity in this 
sector—not by learning by doing, but more through the entry of higher productivity 
firms. Foreign direct investment may also help promote technical advance. Finally, of 
course, the provision of an appropriate level of protection of intellectual property rights 
can help stimulate innovation. 
 
Policy options for reducing transport and communications costs include both 
domestic, unilateral reform options, regional agreements, and multilateral reform options 
through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Hummels feels that one 
possible explanation for the increase in shipping freight rates up to the mid-1980s, despite  
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the introduction of cost-saving innovations such as open registries and improvements in 
shipping technology, was that containerization may have helped strengthen shipping 
cartels.  In the shipping arena, Clark, Dollar and Micco (2001) conclude that improving 
port infrastructure and liberalizing restrictions on cargo handling and provision of port 
services could substantially reduce overall transport costs. Fink, Mattoo and Neagu 
(2001) agree that that government restrictions on entry into port services raise shipping 
costs substantially. However, they conclude that the policies that allow shipping 
conferences to collude in ways that raise rates are a much more important source of cost 
increases. They estimate that removing restrictions on trade in maritime services would 
result in  a nine percent reduction in the average costs of liner shipping. Enacting policies 
that would eliminate the collusive practices that are endemic in the industry would have a 
much greater payoff, allowing a further 25 percent reduction in costs.  They suggest the 
use of the GATS to challenge these restrictive practices, some of which cannot be tackled 
by governments acting unilaterally. 
 
Given the great importance of transport costs for income levels and for economic 
development it seems clear that reform of maritime shipping services should be a high 
priority in future negotiations. Even though reform in this area has proved very difficult 
under the multilateral system in the past (Chia, Onyirimba and Akpan 2001), there seems 
to be an enormous opportunity to make progress that would be important for developing 
countries in the future. Such progress could be particularly important for African 




This paper examines the options for policy makers interested in reducing the 
potential adverse consequences of dependence on resource-based products. It argues that 
any such action should follow a careful examination of the nature of the problems created 
by resource dependence.  If the conclusion is that economic output should be restructured 
to reduce resource dependence, then appropriate policy responses are likely to involve: (i) 
increasing accumulation of the types of physical and human capital needed in the  
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manufactures and service activities most appropriate to the country’s comparative 
advantage; (ii) developing a trade regime that allows the emergence of new export 
activities as comparative advantage shifts; and (iii) promoting technological change in 
manufactures and services.  
 
Over recent decades, developing countries have greatly diversified their exports, 
to the point where manufactures account for over 80 percent of developing country 
merchandise exports. While declines in commodity prices have played a role in this 
change, it appears that there have been other contributing factors—in particular, 
relatively rapid accumulation of human and physical capital in developing countries, and 
a dramatic shift toward more open trade regimes. Biases in technical change do not   
appear to have played a major role in this transformation. If anything, increased 
productivity in developing country agriculture has tended to increase the share of 
agriculture in individual developing countries, although it has inhibited continuing to rely 
on agricultural exports by putting downward pressure on world agricultural prices.   
 
Declines in communication costs have unambiguously helped developing 
countries participate more fully in global manufacturing production. Reductions in air 
transport costs have been helpful to developing countries, while liner freight rates 
actually increased in the period up to 1983 before beginning to decline. Policy action at 
the national level, and potentially through the GATS has an important role to play in 
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Rest of Central European Assoc  89.0 
Rest of South Asia  87.7 
Switzerland 87.5 
United States  86.8 
Belgium/Luxembourg 86.3 
Sri Lanka  85.9 
















Rest of World  62.3 
Indonesia 62.1 
Greece 61.8 
Central America, Caribbean  61.0 




Rest of SACU (Namibia, RSA)  47.1 
Former Soviet Union  44.6 
Rest of North Africa  44.2 
Argentina 39.7 
Venezuela 37.7 
New Zealand  36.3 
Rest of EFTA  34.5 
Colombia 33.6 
Australia 32.1 
Rest of Middle East  31.8 
Zimbabwe 31.2 




Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  17.3 
Rest of South America  14.9 





Source: GTAP 5 database.  
 
 
 
 
 